ABSTRACT Fuzzing is a popular technique which is widely used to find the software bugs. However, fuzzing remains limited in finding bugs lying in deep paths since it has difficulty in bypassing the complex checks of the target program. In this paper, we propose a location sensitive fuzzing approach, named InsFuzz, that leverages the light-weight program analysis technique. We use the static analysis and binary instrumentation to infer the bytes that could influence comparison instructions, which we called key bytes, and, then, to infer the relationship between the key bytes and the comparison instructions during execution. This enables a fuzzer to know which bytes are worth mutating and how these bytes should be mutated. In addition, we collect the comparison progress information (i.e., we record the number of matching bytes between the two operands of an instruction) during execution and preserve the mutated inputs with higher comparison progress. Therefore, the fuzzer can break the comparison instructions efficiently. We first evaluated the InsFuzz on the LAVA-M dataset against other fuzzers, including AFL-Dyninst, and then compared InsFuzz with AFL-Dyninst on five real-world programs. The results show that InsFuzz found more bugs than the fuzzers that we compared with on the LAVA-M dataset. In addition, InsFuzz found some new bugs that the author of LAVA-M did not list. On the real-world programs, InsFuzz triggered more unique crashes and covered more code compared with the AFL-Dyninst.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fuzzing is an efficient technique used to test the security of software [33] , [46] . It feeds the target program with mutated inputs and monitors the status of the program to discover bugs. Compared with other vulnerability mining technology, fuzzing is much simpler and more scalable without resuming too much computing resources.
Fuzzing can be divided into three major categories as blackbox fuzzing [49] , whitebox fuzzing [24] , [35] , [37] and greybox fuzzing [13] based on the degree of structural knowledge used by fuzzers. Blackbox fuzzing does not need any internal knowledge about the program and just executes the program with random inputs. Whitebox fuzzing requires either the knowledge to allow fuzzers to do heavyweight program analysis or the programs' source code can be accessed. Greybox fuzzing uses lightweight program analysis such as binary instrumentation to glean the structure of the program.
Traditional fuzzing has some limitations, such as fuzzers waste a lot of time mutating the unimportant bytes of the input. Sometimes mutation happens on the key bytes, but it is still hard for fuzzers to bypass complex checks because the inputs are constructed randomly. Random inputs may be rejected in the early stages of the execution and could not penetrate deep program code. Thus, it is difficult for the random inputs to trigger the bugs lying deeply in the program. Some methods such as Driller [45] , VUzzer [40] and Angora [17] have been proposed to address this problem by leveraging symbolic execution [18] , [19] , [30] , [34] , [43] , [45] , [36] or taint analysis [12] , [23] , [40] , [17] . However, as these methods relying on symbolic execution or taint analysis which are known as heavy-weight program analysis techniques [31] thus they are less scalable or need more computing resources. Some other light-weight fuzzers, such as AFLFast [38] , Steelix [31] and FairFuzz [28] are proposed to improve the code coverage
In this paper, we present InsFuzz, a binary fuzzer implemented based on AFL (American Fuzzy Loop), which tries to improve code coverage by using lightweight program analysis in the following steps. Firstly, InsFuzz collects the information of comparison instructions (e.g. cmp instruction) that prevent the inputs from penetrating deep code of the target program. Then it instruments the binary program to obtain the actual values of operands and collect the comparison progress information during execution. Secondly, it collects information to infer the dependencies between bytes in the input file and the comparison instructions by mutating bytes continuously. Thirdly, it mutates the bytes at specific locations based on the information collected by the second step and guides mutation based on comparison progress.
We evaluated InsFuzz against the latest version of AFL [6] (2.52, the latest version when writing this paper, QEMUmode), AFL-Dyninst [8] (a binary fuzzer based on AFL and Dyninst it is a variant of AFL to fuzz binaries without source code), VUzzer [40] , AFL-lafintel [3] , [4] and Steelix [31] on LAVA-M [20] dataset, and compared InsFuzz with AFL-Dyninst on 5 real-life programs.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions: 1) We proposed an approach to infer the dependence relations between the bytes in the input file and the comparison instructions which always reject inputs in the early stage of execution. 2) We used a light-weight instrumentation approach to collect comparison progress information during fuzzing process to guide mutation. 3) We implemented a prototype upon the approach proposed in this paper named InsFuzz and evaluated it on LAVA-M dataset and 5 real-life programs. The results show InsFuzz is more effective than other tools. 4) We found some new bugs in real-life programs, four of them have been assigned CVE numbers
II. MOTIVATION EXAMPLE
In order to penetrate the deep code of the target program, AFL [6] uses coverage information as feedback to genetic algorithm and then generates more inputs that may trigger new paths of the target program. AFL is more effective in finding new paths compared with traditional fuzzing method but still has some limitations. AFL wastes a lot of time trying to pass through complex checks with blind mutations because it has no knowledge of where to mutate and how to mutate. Sometimes it wastes time on mutating uninteresting bytes. Sometimes it mutates interesting bytes and generates new input which may partially match the complex checks, but the almost successful mutated input will still be rejected due to the coverage guided property of AFL. So the target program will be terminated ahead of time and the bugs lying deeper are hard to be triggered by AFL.
As an example, Fig1 shows a program contains many complex checks.
C1: It checks on the magic bytes of the input. The program will be terminated if the bytes at specific locations do not match magic string. This situation requires that fuzzers should mutate bytes at the right offset and set the consecutive bytes as ''MAZE''. It is difficult for AFL to do that even though it generates new input which has set the consecutive bytes at the right offset as ''MAZX''. The mutated input is still an unhelpful mutated input file because the code coverage does not change.
C2: It checks on the length of the input file. If the values of corresponding bytes do not match the actual length of the input, the input file will be rejected. Unlike C1, the compared value in this comparison is not fixed. It is determined by the input file.
C3: It checks on the specific string of the input. Unlike the checks we mentioned above, the bytes used in this comparison are not continuous in the input.
We ran AFL and AFL-Dyninst on this code and the binary generated by this code respectively, but the two fuzzers both could not produce any crash input within 10 hours.
Steelix, the closest one to our work, addresses magic check problem by heuristic local exhaustive search. It is easy for Steelix to pass through C1 check. However, C3 check is much difficult for Steelix to bypass because the comparison bytes are from different parts of the input. In this situation the local exhaustive mutation applied by Steelix is not effective. Although Driller, VUzzer, T-Fuzz and Angora can address these problems, as we mentioned above, they apply heavy-weight program analysis, thus they suffer from path explosion problem or need more computing resources and some of them are less scalable for the reallife programs.
We address these challenges by considering the following questions: VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. Overview of InsFuzz.
(1) Where to mutate? In order to find the bytes that deserve to be mutated, we consider adding a mutation stage like the deterministic mutation of AFL. In the deterministic mutation, AFL mutates input file's bytes continuously. We record the original specific values of comparison operands at the beginning of fuzzing, then we mutate the input byte by byte and compare the current operands' values with the original values after each runtime to find the bytes which influence the comparison instructions. We call the bytes that could affect the important comparison instructions as key bytes. As shown in the motivation example, the first four bytes of the input have an influence on the check 1 because when mutate these bytes the operand's value of the comparison instruction would be changed.
By doing this, we can infer the bytes which deserve to be mutated and get the inference information that mutating which bytes will influence the target comparison instructions. Then instead of mutating all the bytes of the input file, we only mutate the bytes having influence on at least one of the comparison instructions. Moreover, we can guide the mutation to help the input to bypass the target comparison checks based on the inference information.
(2) Should the input which almost bypasses a check be discarded?
The two operands' values in a comparison instruction should match totally to bypass a comparison check. Sometimes the mutated input file matches some but not all bytes of the target comparison instruction. In this case, AFL discards this mutated input because the code coverage has not changed, which improves the difficulty for AFL to generate an exactly matched input.
We consider collecting and recording the comparison progress information. If the newly mutated input improves the comparison progress, it will be reserved for further mutation.
(3) How to mutate? To address this problem, we divide the comparison checks into two types and apply different mutation strategies to help the mutated input to bypass the comparison checks. Complex sanity checks like hash checksum are not within our consideration.
The first one is the hardcoded magic check which compares the string from the input file with the hardcoded magic value. As we can get the information about which bytes can influence the target comparison instruction, then we can obtain the length of the corresponding key bytes in the input file. If the length equals the length of an operand in the target instruction, we assume this instruction may be a magic bytes check. Then we mutate the key bytes in the input file with hardcoded magic value byte by byte, e.g., the hardcoded magic value is MAZE in C1 check.
The second one is the normal comparison check. In this case, we only mutate the key bytes which influence the target comparison instructions with the normal mutation strategy of AFL (e.g. bitflip and arithmetic). This approach reduces the number of bytes that need to be mutated compared with AFL.
III. DESIGN
In this section, we present the technical details of InsFuzz. Fig2 shows the overview of InsFuzz. It contains three main components: static analysis, binary instrumentation and fuzzer. The fuzzer component contains two submodules: key bytes inference and mutation guiding.
A. STATIC ANALYSIS
The purpose of the static analysis is to get detail information about the comparison instructions.
Usually, there are too many comparison instructions in a program. It is necessary to filter out the instructions we are not interested in or which are easy for AFL to bypass. The rules we used to filter out uninteresting comparison instructions are as follows.
1) If the length of the value being compared is 1 byte, this instruction will be filtered out. Instructions for onebyte length comparison can be easily bypassed by AFL. 2) Some comparison instructions compare with immediate value 0xFFFFFFFFh or which can be easily bypassed by AFL during the random mutation. These instructions will also be filtered out 3) When fuzzing specific functions of the target program, we do not need to extract comparison instructions in other functions which are not be called.
After filtering out the comparison instructions, we extract detail information about the interesting instructions including the address of the instructions and the length of the operands.
If the operation of an instruction is cmp, we can get the length easily by the type of operands (e.g. the length of EAX is 4 bytes). As for the length of operands in other compar- ison instructions, e.g. memcmp and strncmp, we can find the latest push instruction or mov instruction with immediate value. Usually the immediate value is the third parameter of the comparison function call and it is also the length of the operand. Sometimes it is difficult to get the length of the compared string by only using the static analysis. In this case, we just set the length of these instructions as 16 bytes. This is not an ideal solution because there is a deviation when the length of the operand exceeds 16 bytes.
The extracted information will be used in the following instrumentation step and the fuzzing step.
B. INSTRUMENTATION
We instrument the binary to record the specific values of operands and collect comparison progress information.
The type of operands in an instruction can be register, immediate value or memory dereference. If the operand belongs to memory dereference type, the specific value we record is the string from the memory address instead of the memory address. We record these values in shared memory so that the fuzzer can perform an analysis of them.
We collect comparison progress information of instructions and define the comparison progress as how many bytes of the two compared operands' values are matched. For example (as shown in Fig3), if the value of the first operand is MAGIC and the value of the second operand is IAXZC, the second and fifth bytes of the two values are matched, thus the comparison progress of this instruction is two. If all the bytes of the two operands are the same, we mark the progress as 0xFF. We record the comparison progress information in the shared memory. This progress recording method is different from AFL-lafintel and Steelix. AFL-lafintel splices the multi-byte comparisons into nested byte-by-byte comparisons. Steelix records the progress only when the values of operands are matched continuously from the beginning or the ending of the strings. Compared with AFL-lafintel and Steelix, this method will keep the inputs which match the magic value with non-contiguous magic bytes.
We only calculate comparison progress if the corresponding instruction has been executed to prevent the invalid calculating on progress information. The index of each progress corresponds to the comparison instruction. Both actual values of operands and comparison progress are recorded in the shared memory constructed by InsFuzz instead of the shared memory constructed by AFL to prevent aggravating the hash collision issue [22] .
C. KEY BYTES INFERENCE
The purpose of key bytes inference is to find the bytes that influence comparison instructions and infer the relationship between the key bytes and the comparison instructions.
AFL has many mutation stages: bitflip (flip bit/bytes at sequential positions), arith (arithmetic increment/ decrements), interest (replace with interesting values), extras (replace with value in the dictionary), havoc (randomly mutate the input including delete bytes, insert bytes, etc.), and splice (splice the current input file with another input). They are divided into deterministic mutation and random mutation [1] , [11] .
In the bitflip stage of deterministic mutation, AFL flips input from the beginning to the end by bit or by byte. For example, in the bitflip 8/8 stage, the first byte will be flipped and then the mutated input will be executed as the seed to the target program. AFL monitors the status of the program to see whether the mutated input improves the code coverage or if any crashes happen to the target program. If the mutated input improves code coverage or incurs a crash, it will be added to the queue for further fuzzing, otherwise it will be discarded. Then the first byte of the input will be recovered and the second byte will be flipped. AFL repeats this process until all the bytes have been flipped.
Inspired by the feature of deterministic mutation, we add a stage to mutate the bytes continuously. We call the stage added by us as perturbation. In order to minimize the impact of the program during the perturbation and avoid introducing other characters to the input file which may incur the program to execute the error path (i.e., the program will be terminated ahead of time), we mutate the bytes by replacing the current byte with the next byte.
For easier reference, we list the symbols used in the following sections in Table 1 Algorithm 1 shows how InsFuzz infers the key bytes and the relationship between the key bytes and the comparison instructions.
Before the start of the perturbation, we can get the original specific values of comparison operands by running InsFuzz with the original seed which has not been mutated. We name InsFuzz gets the virgin_valuebits and current_valuebits from shared memory and compares virgin_valuebits with current_valuebits to identify different values between them after each run time. Then it can infer which byte in the input will influence the specific comparison instruction. We only compare the executed comparison instructions which are executed both in the original execution and in the perturbation execution to prevent excessive inference. Note some comparison instructions may be influenced by the same byte of the input. Therefore, we ignore the comparison instruction which has been bypassed and then turn to the new ones to avoid the inference being hindered.
After doing this, InsFuzz records the relationship between the bytes in the input and the comparison instructions, we name it as file_mask. The value of file_mask[i] is the index of comparison instruction which will be influenced when mutating the i th byte of the input file.
For example (see Fig4) , the length of each operand in the first comparison instruction is four. The corresponding value of the two operands should be recorded into virgin_valuebits or current_valuebits from index 0 to 7. Each operand takes 4 bytes. The length of each operand in the second instruction is seven. The corresponding value should be recorded into virgin_valuebits or current_valuebits from index 8 to 21. InsFuzz compares the virgin_valuebits with current_valuebits after each run time. When mutating the eighth byte of the input, InsFuzz finds that the thirteenth byte in current_valuebits and virgin_valuebit are different and both of them have a specific value, which ensures the instruction being executed whenever in the original execution or in the perturbation execution. Then InsFuzz infers mutating the eighth byte would influence the second comparison instruction. The inference result will be recorded into file_mask and the value of the eighth byte will be set as two.
D. MUTATION GUIDING
According to the file_mask that we collected from previous steps, we can guide the mutation based on the comparison progress. We focus on mutating the bytes that have influence on comparison instructions in the deterministic mutation stage until most of the comparison instructions have been bypassed, ie., the number of comparison instructions that have been bypassed reaches a threshold. Due to the strong randomness of AFL's random mutation stage, which contains havoc mutation and splice mutation, we do not plan to change it.
In the mutation stage, once the mutation triggers a new comparison progress or improves the comparison progress we will maintain the mutated input for further mutation.
When the mutation begins, we first try to bypass the hardcoded magic checks which compare the magic value with the consecutive bytes from the input. We find the consecutive bytes in file_mask which have the same value, this means the corresponding consecutive bytes in input influence the same comparison instruction, and then get the total number of the consecutive bytes. Next, we get the operand's length of the affected comparison instruction. If the number equals the length or the gap is small, ie., one byte or two bytes, then we consider the instruction is a hardcoded magic comparison instruction. In this case, we consider the values of both operands as potential magic values and use the actual values of the two operands getting from virgin_valuebits to replace the corresponding bytes of the input. We do this by mutating the input bytes with the byte from potential magic values in turn until all the corresponding input bytes have been mutated or the comparison instruction has been bypassed. If once the mutated byte matches the corresponding byte of the magic value, the comparison progress will be increased and the mutated input will be maintained for further mutation and then the next corresponding input byte will be mutated with the potential magic values byte by byte. If once we bypass the check we will set the comparison progress of this instruction as 0xFF and will not waste any time to bypass it in the further mutation steps. This may bypass part of the magic comparison check, especially the hardcoded magic check. We name this mutation stage as hardcoded magic mutation.
After dealing with the hardcoded magic checks, we give priority to process instructions with effective comparison progress, i.e., comparison progress is greater than and less than 0xFF. For each instruction, InsFuzz queries the file_mask to get the total number of the bytes that could influence the target instruction. If the number of bytes equals the length of the operand, InsFuzz hypothesizes that the instruction is a magic check and the compared bytes used in the comparison are from different parts of the input. Then InsFuzz mutates the corresponding bytes of the input with the values of the operands just like hardcoded magic mutation. If the number of bytes does not equal to the length, InsFuzz considers the check is a normal comparison instruction. Then it uses the mutation strategy that used in AFL to mutate the bytes that may affect the value of the operand in the target instruction. Compared with AFL, InsFuzz reduces the exploration space. In addition, mutated input will be reserved if it improves the target comparison progress.
Algorithm 2 gives the procedure of whole fuzzing loop, we do key bytes inference in line 3, the detail of which has been described in the previous section. The processing of hardcoded magic bytes is in line 4. We guide the mutation from line 6 to 25.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We have implemented InsFuzz based on IDA and a set of open source tools. The static analysis of the binary programs was implemented within IDA using IDAPython [10] . InsFuzz disassembles the target binary program into assembly code with IDA and extracts the information about comparison instructions with IDAPython. In our work we only focus on the x86 32bit instruction, the same as other binary fuzzers VUzzer and Steelix. The instrumentation is implemented by using Dyninst tool [2] , [9] . The main component, fuzzer, is implemented based on AFL 2.52b, the latest version when writing this paper.
In order to measure the effectiveness of InsFuzz, we compared InsFuzz with AFL-Dyninst in code coverage and the ability to find bugs on two datasets LAVA-M binaries and real-life programs.
The experiments were run on a 32 bit Ubuntu 16.04 LTS system equipped with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1231 v3 processor and 8GB memory. We ran all the fuzzers with one core during all the evaluation steps.
A. EXPERIMENTS ON LAVA-M DATASET
LAVA [20] is a dynamic taint analysis-based technique which produces ground-truth corpora by automatically injecting the bugs into the program source code. Each injected bug has a unique ID differentiating with other bugs. LAVA-M is a corpus created by the authors. There are 4 Linux binaries being injected from the GNU coreutils programs: uniq, base64, md5sum, and who. The authors of LAVA-M dataset evaluated FUZZER and SES on these programs for 5 hours, the results of the two fuzzers are from LAVA paper [20] because detail information about these two fuzzers are not revealed, so that it's hard to re-perform the experiments in LAVA paper. VUzzer and Steelix also used this dataset in their evaluation. In addition, the authors of Steelix ran AFL-lafintel on this dataset. The results of VUzzer comes from VUzzer paper [40] , and the results of Steelix and AFL-lafintel come from Steelix paper [31] . We ran InsFuzz for 5 hours, the same time limitation used in the evaluation on other fuzzers. We also performed the experiment on AFL-QEMU and AFL-Dyninst for 5 hours. The evaluation results are presented in Table 2 The results show that InsFuzz found more bugs compared with other fuzzers. In addition, InsFuzz found some new bugs that the author of LAVA-M did not list. The new bugs found by InsFuzz are shown in Table 3 AFL-QEMU and AFL-Dyninst did not trigger any bugs in the four programs during our evaluation. InsFuzz performed better than FUZZER, SES, AFL-QEMU, AFL-Dyninst and Steelix. InsFuzz performed better than VUzzer and AFL-lafintel in base64 and who but worse in uniq We analyze the reasons why InsFuzz found more bugs than AFL-lafintel, VUzzer and Steelix as below.
1) ANALYSIS BETWEEN INSFUZZ AND AFL-LAFINTEL
Compared with AFL-lafintel, InsFuzz has the knowledge about where to mutate according to the information collected by the instrumentation. Owing to many bugs in LAVA-M are protected by the hardcoded magic bytes, InsFuzz can infer the relationship between the bytes of input and comparison instructions correctly. InsFuzz reduces the mutation space and focuses on mutating key bytes. This increases the opportunity to trigger more bugs. AFL-lafintel focuses on addressing the comparison checks that compared with the immediate value. If the compared operand in the comparison instruction is not an immediate value, e.g. memory reference or register, AFL-lafintel can hardly bypass the comparison instructions. AFL-lafintel addresses magic check by converting a magic bytes check into nested one-byte checks, which requires the bytes matching in an order, otherwise it would not preserve the input even though the other bytes are matched but are not yet being compared. InsFuzz will reserve the mutated input file once it matches any byte in the target comparison instruction. In addition, AFL-lafintel increases the basic blocks sharply, but in AFL the size of the shared memory that used to trace the new path is only 65536. Thus AFL-lafintel may be hindered in detecting new paths when increasing too many blocks.
2) ANALYSIS BETWEEN INSFUZZ AND VUZZER
VUzzer uses the taint analysis to infer the location of the magic value in the input file, so the execution speed is slower than InsFuzz due to the heavy-weight nature of taint analysis. In addition, VUzzer only focuses on dealing with the magic checks compared with immediate value, but InsFuzz tries to bypass all the comparison instructions whose operands include register, memory dereference and immediate value. 
3) ANALYSIS BETWEEN INSFUZZ AND STEELIX
Steelix uses the same light-weight instrumentation approach to bypass the comparison checks. Steelix considers the comparison progress as effective only when bytes in an operand match the target string from the beginning or the end continuously. Therefore, the mutated input that matches the magic string partially with discontinuous magic bytes will be discarded but InsFuzz will keep the mutated input for further mutating. Steelix addresses the magic check when once mutation improves comparison progress and then it will use local exhaustive mutation to mutate the bytes near the matched byte in the input. However, sometimes the mutated byte is not the byte being compared with the magic value. It improves the progress just by changing the execution flow. In this case, even though the comparison progress is improved, Steelix has no knowledge to bypass it. InsFuzz does not have this limitation, even though the comparison progress is not triggered, InsFuzz can address hardcoded magic comparison checks with the key bytes and relationship inference knowledge. In addition, InsFuzz can bypass the magic checks in which the magic bytes are from different parts of the input but Steelix cannot bypass this kind of checks.
B. EXPERIMENTS ON REAL WORLD PROGRAMS
In order to measure the effectiveness of InsFuzz in the real life, we evaluated the experimentation in 5 realworld programs: size, readelf, nm-new, tiffinfo and jhead against AFL-Dyninst in code coverage and the ability to find the unique crashes. Steelix is the closest fuzzer to InsFuzz, but nether its source code nor its binary tools were not released when writing this paper. Hence on the real world programs we cannot compare InsFuzz with Steelix. We fed AFL-Dyninst and InsFuzz with the same input and ran the two fuzzers continuously for 48 hours. Table 4 shows the results of unique crashes triggered by the two fuzzers. InsFuzz found 5, 24, 37, 314 unique crashes We analyzed these crashes and found some new bugs, four of them have been assigned CVE numbers (CVE-2018-16554, CVE-2018-17088, CVE-2018-18452, CVE-2018-18833)
1) UNIQUE CRASHES

2) COVERAGE
In order to measure the code coverage, we counted the paths, which defined by AFL, found by the two fuzzers over time and used the afl-cov [7] to obtain the cumulative code coverage. Fig.5 shows the number of cumulative paths found by AFL-Dyninst and InsFuzz. We can see that InsFuzz triggered more paths compared with AFL-Dyninst. Table 5 shows the comparison of AFL-Dyninst and InsFuzz on cumulative line, function and branch coverage. The results show that InsFuzz covers more code than AFL-Dyninst. We classify the reasons by analyzing these programs as follows.
First, there are some magic value checks in these programs. InsFuzz can bypass magic value comparisons easily. In addition, during the deterministic mutation InsFuzz focus on mutating the bytes that have influence on the comparison instructions until the number of the comparison instructions having been bypassed reaches a threshold. InsFuzz does not perform the deterministic mutation (e.g., bitflip 1/1), on all the bytes of input files. It increases the opportunity to trigger new paths.
Second, InsFuzz can perform mutation on an input file faster and turn to the next input file more quickly because of the reduced mutation space of deterministic mutation. Even though we have added an additional mutation stage and incurs more consumption steps to record the operands' values, calculate the comparison progress and get the information from memory to guide the mutation, InsFuzz still executes more random mutation, which can improve coverage within the first several hours of fuzzing [5] , compared with AFL-Dyninst in the same time.
V. RELATED WORK
To improve the efficiency of fuzzing, researchers have proposed many approaches in these years.
A. FEEDBACK BASED FUZZING
Feedback based approaches are often used to select the seed input and are also used to improve code coverage based on the status of the fuzzing process.
AFLFast [38] uses a Markov chain to model the challenges and opportunities in fuzzing and chooses the seed input which exercises the low-frequency paths based on the fuzzing feedback. It assigns the inputs which exercise low-frequency paths with high energy to allow them to generate more new inputs file and in turn hit more rare paths. Steelix [31] uses instrumentation to get the comparison progress information and applies a heuristic approach to address the magic check problem once the comparison progress improved based on the feedback comparison progress. Then Steelix performs a local exhaustive mutation on the target bytes according to the feedback. FairFuzz [28] modifies the deterministic mutation of AFL in order to determine the parts of the input that cannot be mutated to promise hit the rare branch. It prioritizes the inputs exercising rare parts of the program and adjusts mutation based on the fuzzing feedback.
Among the fuzzers mentioned above, Steelix is the closest one to InsFuzz. Due to the heuristic search by the near bytes, it is impossible for Steelix to break through the magic bytes comparisons which are from different parts of the input.
B. TAINT ANALYSIS BASED FUZZING
Taint analysis based approaches are often used to infer the relationship between the seed input and the logic of the target program efficiently. BuzzFuzz [23] detects locations that influence potential attack points by dynamic taint analysis and then fuzzes these regions. TaintScope [48] uses dynamic taint analysis to identify checksum fields and combines with the symbolic execution to generate inputs to trigger the potential vulnerabilities. AUTOGRAM [26] uses dynamic taint analysis to trace the data flow of each input character and learn a context-free grammar which reflects valid input structure. VUzzer [40] infers the offsets of the magic bytes in the input by using dynamic taint analysis based on the Pin dynamic analysis framework [32] . Angora [17] uses the scalable byte-level taint tracking to identify the bytes in the seed input which deserve to be mutated.
Taint analysis is precise to infer the dependencies between the input and program logic but it needs more computing resources and time. InsFuzz only uses the light-weight technique to infer the relationship between the seed input and the VOLUME 7, 2019 target program heuristically and then reduces the space of the exploration.
C. SYMBOLIC EXECUTION BASED FUZZING
Symbolic execution based approaches are often used to generate the inputs that can bypass the sanity check in the program [44] . It collects the path constraints and then generates the new input that can bypass checks by constraint solving engine. Symbolic execution faces the path explosion challenge, but due to its ability to generate high-coverage input, some approaches combine fuzzing with it to improve fuzzing performance, e.g., KLEE [15] , SAGE [29] , DART [21] , SYMFUZZ [42] , and Driller [45] .
Driller is the latest fuzzer among them. When fuzzing gets stuck Diller uses selective symbolic execution to collect the path constraints and generate new inputs to bypass the checks. Symbolic execution slows the software testing due to the heavyweight property of it. Thus it is hard to apply to realworld applications [16] .
D. LEARNING BASED FUZZING
Some tools learn from the valid input files to discard the invalid inputs or generate new seed inputs. MoWF [37] leverages information about the file format and data chunks from the valid files to rule out the most invalid inputs. Skyfire [47] leverages the knowledge learning from a vast amount of existing inputs to generate the new inputs. Learn&Fuzz [25] uses sample inputs and neural-network-based machine learning to generate an input grammar suitable for input fuzzing. Deep Reinforcement Fuzzing [14] uses reinforcement learning to generate new inputs with high reward. Rajpal et al. [39] propose an approach that learns patterns in the input files from past fuzzing explorations to guide future fuzzing explorations with neural networks.
All of these tools need lots of input files as the training set. However, InsFuzz does not have such a requirement.
E. PROGRAM TANDFORMATION BASED FUZZING
Some approaches use the idea of program transformation technique to bypass the complex sanity checks. AFLlafintel [3] splits the magic comparison into multiple nested one-byte comparisons by applying program transformation at LLVM IR level [27] . TaintScope identifies checksum checks and then instruments the corresponding branch instructions to force the conditional jump instructions always taken or not taken. T-Fuzz [36] removes sanity checks in the target application by program transformation and then fuzzes the transformed program, finally uses a symbolic executionbased approach to filter out false positives.
However, these approaches need lots of manual efforts. AFL-lafintel works only when it can access the source code of the program. T-fuzz may incur false positives so it seeks help from a symbolic execution-based approach to filter out the false positives.
F. OTHER APPROACHES BASED FUZZING
Rebert et al. [41] focuses on optimizing seed selection problem and design six different algorithms. They formulate the problem as an integer linear programming problem to measure the quality of seed selection algorithms. Wen Xu et al. designs and implements new operating primitives specialized for fuzzing to improve fuzzing performance [50] . CollAFL [22] observes the path collisions in AFL which prevent fuzzers from discovering potential paths and making wise decisions on fuzzing strategies. CollAFL solves the hash collision issue in AFL by ensuring that each edge has a unique hash.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Fuzzing is an efficient technique to find vulnerabilities in programs. However, it is hard for fuzzers to bypass complex checks with the traditional blind mutation. To address this problem, we consider questions about where to fuzz and how to fuzz in the fuzzing execution. We leverage light-weight instrumentation technique to infer key bytes in the input that deserve to be mutated and the relationship between key bytes and comparison instructions. Then we use the information to guide the mutation based on comparison progress.
We have implemented our fuzzing approach in a fuzzer named InsFuzz. To evaluate the effectiveness of InsFuzz, we compared it with other fuzzers in code coverage and the ability to find bugs on LAVA-M and 5 real-life programs. In the LAVA-M dataset, InsFuzz found more bugs than other tools and found some new bugs that the authors of LAVA-M did not list. In the real-life programs, InsFuzz triggered more unique crashes compared with AFL-Dyninst. The results show that InsFuzz raises fuzzing without heavyweight technique both in the ability to find bugs and the code coverage.
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